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Processes of social flourishing and their liminal collapse: 
elements to a genealogy of globalization 
Arpad Szakolczai, UCC 
 
Abstract 
 
This article aims at exploring a long-term historical perspective on which contemporary 
globalization can be more meaningfully situated. A central problem with established 
approaches to globalization is that they are even more presentist than the literature on 
modernization was. Presentism not only means the ignoring of history, but also the 
unreflective application to history of concepts taken from the study of the modern 
world. In contrast, it is argued that contemporary globalization is not a unique 
development, but rather is a concrete case of a historical type. Taking as its point of 
departure the spirit, rather than the word, of Max Weber, this article extends the scope of 
sociological investigation into archaeological evidence. Having a genealogical design and 
introducing the concept of ‘liminality’, the article approaches the modern process of 
globalization through reconstructing the internal dynamics of another type of historical 
change called ‘social flourishing’. Taking up the Weberian approach continued by 
Eisenstadt in his writings on ‘axial age’, it moves away from situations of crisis as 
reference point, shifting attention to periods of revival by introducing the term 
‘epiphany’. Through the case of early Mesopotamia, it shows how social flourishing can 
be transmogrified into globalizing growth, gaining a new perspective concerning the kind 
of ‘animating spirit’ that might have driven the shift from Renaissance to Reformation, 
the rise of modern colonialism, or contemporary globalization. More generally, it will 
retrieve the long-term historical background of the axial age and demonstrate the 
usefulness and importance of archaeological evidence for sociology. 
 
 
Key words: axial age; comparative historical sociology; Max Weber; genealogy; liminality; 
religious experience 
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Introduction: Overcoming presentism 
 
That we now live in a global age seems to be beyond question. However, what 
globalization really means, together with its exact dynamics and possible outcomes, is 
very much up for interpretation. And some aspects of the dominant, even taken-for-
granted, view are puzzling, problematic, or deeply questionable. 
 Globalization is generally identified as a paradigm replacing modernity or 
modernization (Giddens 1990) – the distinction between globality and globalization 
being perplexingly unclear (Pieterse 2012: 12). In this context, a most evident aspect of 
globalization concerns the reduction of distance, expressed in the ‘time-space 
compression’ idea of David Harvey (1989), due to epochal changes in transportation and 
telecommunication. This perspective can be traced to the origins of the concept in 
business studies, particularly visible in the literature celebrating new stages in forever 
accelerating technological revolutions, linked to the ‘experience economy’ (Hawken, 
Lovins and Lovins 1999; Pine and Gilmore 1999). 
However, globalization, especially through the ‘global city’ (Abu-Lughod 2000; 
Castells 2000; Sassen 1991), also entails the reduction of living space, which is much 
more problematic, concerning both desirability and rationality. Just as problematic is the 
conviction, rarely stated though almost always implied, that living in a global age means 
that whatever happened in the past is radically losing its value and relevance. The result is 
that the current literature on globalization is even more encircled by the present than the 
sociology of modernization was (Inglis 2014; Elias 1987). Following Nederveen Pieterse 
(2012: 19–20), this article agrees with Jerry Bentley that such ‘modernocentrism’, or 
presentism, is a greater problem than Eurocentrism, as it was ‘an enchantment with the 
modern world that has blinded scholars and the general public alike to continuities 
between premodern and modern times’ (Bentley 2006: 17). This represents an evident 
methodological problem for sociology, as it means generalization out of a single case.  
Furthermore, presentism is not limited to ignoring history, but can be detected 
even in most of those approaches that attempt to reconstruct the historical forces that 
led to the rise of the modern global world. The problem is that even the most influential 
approaches unthinkingly apply conceptual tools to the past that were developed in and 
for modern societies. These include the efforts to apply to earlier periods the framework 
of world systems theory developed by Wallerstein (Algaze 1993; Frank and Gills 1993), 
itself a version of neo-Marxism; or the monumental work of Michael Mann (2012-3), 
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whose four-factor model of the sources of social power (presumed to be universally 
evident throughout the course of history) was in fact simply the product of a Parsonian 
neo-Kantian reading of Max Weber. Both approaches share a ‘faith in the power of 
social theory generated on the basis of modern experience to guide scholarly analysis of 
the past ages’ (Bentley 2006: 17). 
As a further shortcoming, such efforts, taking their lead from nineteenth century 
German philosophies of history, come across as over-generalizing and bloated exercises 
in intellectual geopolitics. Thus, for example, in his preface to the new edition of Volume 
One, when defining the method followed in his work, Mann indicates that his focus will 
be on the ‘ “leading edge[s] of power” ’ (Mann 2012-3, I: viii). This seems self-evident, 
yet – and in radical contrast to the approaches of Weber or Foucault – in doing so, Mann 
simply skips the sociologically much more interesting question of how the moving force 
driving such an entity comes into being. This was the concern motivating Max Weber’s 
work focusing on the ‘spirit’ of capitalism, where Weber, instead of reducing religion to 
an ‘ideological factor’, recognized the central role played by religious factors in historical 
dynamics. 
The aim of this article, having a genealogical design, guided by the Nietzschean 
concern with ‘backward inference’ and introducing the concept ‘liminality’, is to 
understand the modern process of globalization through reconstructing the internal 
dynamics of a type of historical change called ‘social flourishing’. Far from offering either 
a critique or confirmation of neoliberalism or neo-Marxism, the aim is to understand, 
through the distant and singular but quite significant historical case of early 
Mesopotamia, how social flourishing all-too-easily mutates into globalizing growth. In 
this way we can gain a new perspective concerning the kind of ‘animating spirit’ that 
might have driven not just contemporary globalization, but the shift from Renaissance to 
Reformation, and the rise of modern colonialism. In order to situate globalization 
properly within a long-term historical perspective, this article will take up the approach 
pioneered by Weber and continued by Eisenstadt in his writings on the ‘axial age’. But it 
will move away from situations of crisis as unique reference point, shifting attention to – 
prior or subsequent – periods of revival or rebirth. Thus, without belittling the 
significance of Weber’s shift of emphasis away from an Enlightenment-inspired 
(mis)reading of the Renaissance as a period of secularization, this article will pay careful 
attention to the type of period to which a major part the Renaissance belongs, defining 
this as a period of social flourishing, and will conceptualise globalizing processes as 
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inflexions of social flourishing into an unlimited, thus necessarily violent, expansion. 
More generally, it will retrieve the long-term historical background of the axial age and 
demonstrate the usefulness and importance of archaeological evidence for sociology. 
 
Beyond conventional globalization theory: Weber and Eisenstadt 
 
As a point of departure, this article turns to the work of Max Weber. Weber redirected 
the historical understanding of modernity in two ways, both in two consecutive steps. 
First, while, since the Enlightenment, the temporal horizon for the rise of the ‘new age’ 
was the Renaissance, Weber shifted focus to the Reformation. In his later work, he 
traced the distant roots of Puritan ‘rationalization’ to Antiquity, focusing on classical 
Hebrew prophets and jumping over the Renaissance, a period Weber never discussed in 
substance. 
 A second redirection concerns the revalorization of religion for the rise of 
modernity. It is a commonplace to identify modernity with secularization. Following 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, Weber attributed a direct and decisive role to religious 
factors in the emergence of modernity – a radical shift whose significance even today is 
not fully appreciated, much due to the general neglect of Nietzsche’s impact on Weber. 
Though not ‘Nietzschean’, Weber used Nietzsche’s writings as a source of 
inspiration, complementing Nietzsche’s concern with resentment with a focus on the 
experience of suffering as central source for religious revival. Yet Weber still got 
entrapped in the modality of Nietzsche’s fundamentally negative interpretation of 
religion. Religious experience, for Weber, remained tied to events dislocating the 
ordinary course of life. This is visible in several aspects of Weber’s work, especially when 
taken together: ignoring the Renaissance in the genealogy of modernity; the focus, in the 
title of a major essay, on the religious rejections of the world (Weber 1948a); connecting 
charisma to periods of ‘extraordinary needs’ and ‘moments of distress’ (Weber 1978: 
1111);1 coming close to reducing religious experiences to psychological, even 
psychopathological states (1948b: 279–80, 1978: 1112–3, 1117–8, 1121); and in his 
intellectualizing of religious leadership (1948b: 280). 
 
S.N. Eisenstadt and the study of the ‘Axial Age’ 
In contemporary historical sociology, a major way to keep Weber’s legacy alive is the 
‘axial age’ discussion. Coined as ‘axis time’ just after WW2 by Karl Jaspers, Weber’s 
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closest disciple, the central idea is that the period 800BC–200BC represents the main 
turning point in the history of humankind, as it was during this period that ‘parallel 
spiritual outbursts’ took place, involving all the major world religions and philosophies or 
their sources (Jaspers 1953). Ignored during the period of the Cold War, except for Eric 
Voegelin’s Order and History project, Eisenstadt pioneered its re-launching (Eisenstadt 
1982, 1986, 1992; Arnason, Eisenstadt and Wittrock 2005). The project involved a 
number of major sociologists and scholars from around the world, among others Bjorn 
Wittrock, Johann Arnason, Alessandro Pizzorno, Saïd Arjomand, Jan Assmann, 
Christian Meier, Wolfgang Schluchter, Bernhard Giesen and Peter Wagner. The central 
aspect of Eisenstadt’s contribution was to bring together ‘in a systematic fashion’ the 
discussion on the ‘axial age’ and comparative civilizational analysis (Arnason 2005: 19; 
see also Wittrock 2005). 
As presented by Jaspers and continued by Voegelin, the ‘Axial Age’ was bound to 
be a major way to situate globalization on a comparative historical framework. Eric 
Voegelin, who as a visiting student met Jaspers in Heidelberg, comparable to the manner 
in which Parsons studied under Alfred Weber there, argued that the period following the 
‘axial age’ was a kind of ‘global’ age: the ‘ecumenic’ age, the age of world-conquering 
empires (Persian, Macedonian and Roman), animated by ‘concupiscential conquest’ 
(Voegelin 1974). Weber’s concern with ‘world rejection’, Voegelin’s ‘ecumenic age’ and 
contemporary ‘globalism’ or mondialisme all capture the same movement: a sudden 
predilection with limitless expansion, a titanic effort to extend into the entire known or 
inhabited world – whether by conquest, exploration or market-building. Given 
Eisenstadt’s prior study of empires (Eisenstadt 1963), and the close connection Jaspers 
and Voegelin perceived between ‘global’ empire-building and the axial age, one could 
expect Eisenstadt to turn the axial age discussion into a vehicle for contextualizing 
globalization. Yet Eisenstadt’s interest in axial age faded, and he launched instead the – 
quite different, and highly problematic – ‘multiple modernities’ project (Eisenstadt 2000). 
This is visible through a recent, prominent publication about the axial age (Bellah and 
Joas 2012), where Eisenstadt only resumed his previous work, the connection to 
‘multiple modernities’ (mentioned only once; see in Bellah and Joas 2012: 288) remaining 
unexplored. This might be due to the inherent tension between a Weberian reckoning 
about the fateful forces launching modern globalization, and the celebration of the many 
paths available to reach the promised lands of modernity. 
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In spite of the importance of Eisenstadt’s work in keeping alive the Weberian 
interest in long-term historical sociology, and in particular its potential usefulness for 
understanding globalization, his approach has serious shortcomings. To begin with, 
Eisenstadt never clarified the exact character of the religious developments that took 
place in the axial age. He repeatedly asserted the fundamental novelty of the axial age in 
contrast to all other cultures and religions, focusing on its transcendent character and 
prominently using the expression ‘transcendental vision’ (Eisenstadt 1982, 1988). As he 
describes it, however, this vision was limited to a cognitive, reflective elaboration of a 
systematic, normative, moralizing world-view, having little substantive religious content. 
For Eisenstadt the carriers of ‘transcendental vision’ are intellectuals, following Weber’s 
occasional leaning towards intellectualism and the related downplaying of transcendence 
to situations of crisis. Thus, as Eisenstadt neither connects the spiritual breakthroughs of 
the axial age to the existential threat of empire-building, nor to an autonomous religious 
experience, it ends up being perplexingly close to the manner in which modern French 
rationalism or German idealism proposes to build purely intellectual, idealist systems, 
little connected to substantial religious experiences. Eisenstadt also reproduced the 
Weberian restriction of interest to male prophets hearing voices, excluding – mostly 
female – visionaries seeing scenes, central also in the Weberian exclusive preference for 
the Reformation over the Renaissance. 
 Part of the problem with Eisenstadt is that, in spite of taking into account the 
work of Jaspers, he still reads Weber through Parsons, rather than through Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche’s works, in particular Genealogy of Morals (1967), offer guidelines about reading 
history as it was effectively made, and not glancing at it through our concepts and 
interests, as the only way to recognize the basic role played by religious factors in early 
history. As elaborated immediately below, in order to make it effective for sociological 
analysis, however, genealogy as a method should be complemented by two 
anthropologically derived concepts: liminality and imitation. 
 
Methodology: Revisiting genealogy through liminality and imitation 
 
This study is guided by the Nietzschean concern with ‘backward inference’ (Nietzsche 
1974: 329) – the idea that one must intuit the forces that contributed in the past to the 
emergence of certain social or political practices and institutions that later became taken 
for granted, reconstructing their ‘conditions of emergence’. The central idea, particularly 
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clear in geology or archaeology, disciplines that exerted a great impact on the mode of 
thinking exercized by both Nietzsche and Foucault, is that the present ‘surface’ is only 
the visible part of a number of layers built successively upon each other. If we move 
through such layers backward from the present, the first layers uncovered are the most 
recent ones, which themselves often modified or altered the previous layers; but if we try 
to understand the dynamics of historical processes, we have to start from the most 
distant ones (in so far as they can be evidenced), ‘bracketing’ – as if through a series of 
Husserlian epochés – the later layers of modification and interpretation that hinder the 
reconstructive understanding of earlier layers. 
 Nietzsche-inspired genealogy will be complemented with liminality (Van Gennep 
1960; Thomassen 2010, 2014; Turner 1967, 1969) and imitation (Girard 1977, 1989). 
Developed by anthropologists studying rites of passage, liminality is particularly helpful 
for historical sociologists, as it performs the almost impossible: how to analyse, in a 
coherent manner, what happens in those moments of transition when existing 
boundaries are dissolved and new ones come into being. Weber’s ‘out of ordinary’ 
situations can thus be considered as real-world large-scale liminal moments, while 
genuine epiphanies are those experiences of the sacred that are not directly called forth 
by liminal situations of emergency. 
 Imitative processes are closely associated with liminality (Horvath 2013). Under 
liminal conditions, when limits or boundaries are lifted, imitative forms of behaviour can 
quickly proliferate in the social body, generating rivalries and breaking down social order 
through the mimetics of desire, and at the extreme, setting the scene for ritualistic 
scapegoating and sacrifice. Girard did well to return our attention to rituals of sacrifice, 
whose centrality for social life was earlier emphasized by Durkheim and Mauss. 
However, he over-extended his case by considering the sacrificial mechanism as not only 
the sole origin of culture but seeing it in dissociated terms, failing to incorporate the 
specific connections between technology (understood as the mass-production of 
identical objects of prestige and warfare), and rituals of sacrifice. 
 Genealogy, following Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault, requires us to reconstruct 
both the means and prevailing conditions through which early religions emerged. But we 
are faced by a scarcity of data particularly an absence of written documents. Happily, 
however, recent archaeological discoveries offer new means to study the force that 
eventually gave birth to globalizing processes. 
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The use of archaeology in sociology 
 
Of all social sciences, perhaps archaeology has the fewest connections with sociology. 
Yet ignoring archaeology deprives sociology of a valuable resource.  
 Such a claim can be supported through the classics. Weber and Elias, and 
likewise Durkheim and Mauss, had a vital interest in the present, yet, in order to see 
behind the taken-for-granted, their most mature work was searching for reference points 
in the distant past through history or in faraway places through anthropology. Through 
archaeology, such a gaze can be extended to ‘prehistoric’ civilizations, enlarging the time 
horizon and retrieving links with anthropology. 
 Archaeology, furthermore, is at once the most and least ‘scientific’ social science. 
Both excavation methods and subsequent dating of findings require highly specialized 
training. Yet, in dealing with cultures that disappeared many thousand years ago, the lines 
of contemporary specialization become meaningless, while the nature of an excavation, 
involving the literal destruction of the site in the process, requires that archaeologists 
must gain a vision of the whole.  
 Familiarization with archaeology requires heavy investment. Yet the benefits 
derived, concerning both new methodological perspectives and substantial findings, are 
huge. Concerning the former, archaeology has a special affinity with genealogy. Social 
scientists have a tendency to see the past through the present, transferring contemporary 
categories onto past realities. Archaeologists, however, are forced by the very logic of 
their excavations to abandon this perspective: removing accumulated material from the 
present surface, they must reconstruct the site from its earliest beginnings (see Simonetti 
2013). Concerning findings, a series of decisive discoveries over the past decades (in 
particular Chauvet, Göbekli Tepe and Atapuerca) radically altered our vision of the 
distant human past, breaking with the linear, materialist evolutionism that still dominates 
much of the social sciences and assigning primacy to religious factors (see Cauvin 2000; 
Schmidt 2000). The two central terms around which much of this archaeologically based 
revalorization of religion seems to converge are epiphany and pilgrimage: places where a 
certain presence was felt, and which therefore became centres of human movement. 
 It is quite risky for non-experts to venture into interpreting archaeological 
evidence. However, as nobody can be ‘expert’ concerning the manner in which human 
beings lived many thousand years ago, an imaginative reconstruction based on the 
available evidence requires manifold collaboration by social scientists. Historically and 
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anthropologically oriented sociologists might claim a legitimate place among such efforts, 
following jointly the footsteps of Max Weber and Marcel Mauss. In the following, a 
model is offered to identify a type of social process that could have been sparked by 
epiphany experiences, eventually inflected into globalizing growth. 
 
A typology of social dynamics: From epiphany through social flourishing and 
globalization to dark ages 
 
Archaeology, by the nature of the undertaking, is replete with signs of destruction. Yet 
some of the most important archaeological sites also contain findings that excavators 
interpret as venerations of divine presence (epiphany or hierophany). 
Hierophany, or the sudden manifestation of the sacred, is a central term in the 
work of Mircea Eliade, a major historian of religion, for whom it is such a presence that 
establishes the distinction between the sacred and the profane, securing the reality of the 
first, its location becoming venerated as the centre of the world (omphalos; Eliade 1959, 
see also Burkert 1985). Such epiphanies are just as often the origins of new religions as 
are the appearance of charismatic prophets; in fact, Christianity is not a prophetic 
religion, but rather is rooted in epiphany. Places of epiphany, furthermore, usually 
become centres of pilgrimage. The religion of Minoan Crete, distant source of classical 
Greek culture, is also traced to epiphany experiences (Kerényi 1976; Matz 1958; 
Marinatos 1993). Central for the emergence of epiphany-based religion is the absence of 
preceding crisis. In sociology, epiphany was recently theorized by Bernhard Giesen as an 
exceptional encounter with the sacred that leaves a lasting mark on those effected, 
possibly altering the course of history for entire cultures, even though it ‘defies any 
profane reasoning’ (Giesen 2006: 338). 
 Epiphany experiences might lead to ‘social flourishing’. This expression will be 
used as a technical term, in contrast to ‘growth’ or ‘development’. The various 
development paradigms that emerged in the post-war period (modernization, economic 
development, even sustainable development) have run out of steam. The problem goes 
beyond the limits of economic indexes in measuring quality of life. Economic theory 
emphasizes individual consumption as measure of prosperity, an approach pushed 
beyond any meaningful limit; while normative political philosophy, as exemplified by the 
paradigmatic work of John Rawls, is entrapped in the impossible double negation of 
eliminating all suffering. 
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 This is why the term ‘social flourishing’ carries an important message. Rather 
than contrasting ‘individual’ and ‘society’, and beyond merely quantitative measures, 
social flourishing is secured by care for the quality of being, evoking a concern with 
overall harmony and beauty and reclaiming the ‘rational’ from ‘rational choice’ theory 
that starts from the isolated individual, instead of proportionality (ratio in its etymological 
sense). For this, limits must be respected, resisting the pressure of the unlimited (apeiron; 
see Plato, Philebus) or the ‘liminal’, producing a harmonious growth that transcends the 
opposition between unbridled dynamism and legalistic stability. Social flourishing as a 
concept can help to revalorize periods called ‘renaissance’,2 again complementing the 
sociology of Weber by a type of period ignored by him. 
Using the methodological framework outlined above, social flourishing and 
limitless globalization can be conceived of as two different modes of liminality, the focus 
being on the point of inflection between the two. This happens when the former is 
replaced by exclusive emphasis on quantitative matters, on numbers, growth and 
extension, ignoring limits and thus inevitably promoting aggressiveness against fellow 
humans and nature. Limitless globalization thus inevitably leads to conflict and violence, 
setting into motion the sacrificial mechanism analysed by Girard and replacing a 
renaissance with the onset of a ‘dark age’. 
 As a concrete case study for the inflexion of social flourishing into globalizing 
growth, this article will present the case of early Mesopotamia. 
 
 
Early Mesopotamia 
 
Mesopotamia is the standard starting point for studies about the history of civilizations – 
though not always for the right kind of reasons. Since the first excavations took place 
there in the middle of the nineteenth century, it was widely recognized that the first large 
cities, and then states, emerged there (Wengrow 2010; Yoffee 1995). However, such 
concerns were much dominated with Enlightenment rationalism, Napoleonic conquests, 
colonialism and the Hegelian elevation of the Prussian state into a model, culminating in 
the idea that human civilization is identical to state formation, bureaucracy and writing, 
rooted in the ‘Westphalian framing’ (Salvatore 2007), and the technological 
transformation and exploitation of nature.  
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 In recent decades, a series of excavations in south-eastern Turkey and northern 
Iraq, together with a reinterpretation of previous findings, shed new light on this process. 
While it was long since recognized that the sacred city was the characteristic form of 
early civilization in Mesopotamia (Clark 1977: 77), these findings demonstrated the 
religious roots of civilizational outbursts. They also shed new light on the long-standing 
controversy between Lewis Mumford and Jane Jacobs about the relationship between 
agriculture, village and city in generating civilizational dynamics. 
 According to the materialist-evolutionist reading codified by V. Gordon Childe, 
historical changes are driven by technological advances; thus the ‘agricultural revolution’ 
was followed by settlement in villages and the rise of the cities. In contrast to this, in his 
classic The City in History, Lewis Mumford (1966) made the stunning claim that cities grew 
out caves, not villages. As part of her long-standing criticism of Mumford, Jane Jacobs 
promoted large and dense cities as ideals, arguing that the rise of the city came before 
agriculture. Her argument was recently taken up by Peter Taylor (2014), who largely 
ignored archaeological evidence (Smith, Ur and Feinman 2014), except for the case of 
Çatal Höyük, and imposed a modernist, economistic framework on the past. Yet this 
approach contains a modicum of truth, indeed confirmed by contemporary 
archaeological evidence. The city as regional centre, and not simply a large agglomeration 
of houses, grew out of sanctuaries, centres of pilgrimage, preceding the rise of agriculture 
and even sparking this development (Schmidt 2000, 2010).3 This is the context in which 
the rise of the first cities and states in Mesopotamia can be meaningfully situated. 
In light of the available new evidence and with the help of comparative 
archaeological, anthropological and historical perspectives, this article will shift the time 
horizon from the early processes of state building (3rd millennium BC), to an earlier 
period of social flourishing (6th millennium BC), reconstructing – no doubt in a highly 
tentative manner – the experiential bases of Mesopotamian temple cults. The first global 
city, Uruk, will be situated in this context, connected to the rise of metallurgy in southern 
Turkey and the subsequent development of Arslantepe into the first centre of mass 
industrial production and standardized bureaucracy. 
A study of early Mesopotamian religion is difficult, as it not just religious texts 
that are lacking – images are scarce as well. This led to a genuine prohibition of study by 
Leo Oppenheim, a distinguished Assyriologist who published an influential book on 
Mesopotamian civilization with the subliminally misleading subtitle ‘portrait of a dead 
civilization’. The first section of its fourth chapter was entitled ‘[w]hy a “Mesopotamian 
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religion” should not be written’, its central argument being that ‘a systematic presentation 
of Mesopotamian religion’ cannot be done, due partly to the scarcity of available sources, 
and partly to our – presumed – inability to understand them (Oppenheim 1977: 171–2). 
 
Reconstructing the experiential basis of Mesopotamian religion  
 
Paucity of evidence can be alleviated by insights gained through comparative 
perspectives. A particularly perceptive analysis of the earliest available images is offered 
by Henrietta Groenewegen-Frankfort (1951) as part of her pioneering and still unique 
comparative study of Egypt, Mesopotamian and Minoan Crete. According to her, images 
from the sacred enclosure of Eanna, the oldest area of Uruk, exude intimacy with the 
deity, in contrast to representations of the human and the divine in the Akkadic period, 
characterized by widespread warfare (Groenewegen-Frankfort 1951: 168). Groenewegen-
Frankfort’s intuitions were confirmed by Marcella Frangipane, current excavator of 
Arslantepe, who also interpreted the earlier findings, going back as far as the 6th 
millennium BC, as indicating openness and confidence (Frangipane 1996: 81–6).  
 A complementary understanding of early Mesopotamian religion can be gained 
through the imposing stone temple structures. Here I will take as my guide Jean-Claude 
Margueron, the most distinguished contemporary French scholar of Mesopotamia, 
director of the excavations at Mari from 1979 to 2004. Margueron’s essay, in the best 
tradition of comparative archaeology as championed by Henri Frankfort (Wengrow 
1999, 2010), analyses the physical shape of the over 150 temple structures in 
Mesopotamia and the Levant (Margueron 2005). The aim was to recover the type of 
ritual practices performed in these temples and their meaning. A central finding 
concerned the spatial continuity of the temple’s centre, the ‘holy of holies’: no matter 
how much a temple’s outline changed over time, its location persisted. It was a genuine 
omphalos, identifying the spot of divine apparition: the temple was built ‘at the place 
where the god decided to show himself to men’ (Margueron 2005: 14). 
The long-term continuities in Mesopotamian civilization are confirmed by a 
recent study of the earliest texts, going back to the 4th millennium BC. These 
pictographic texts, discovered in 1931, were published in 1936, but not read as texts until 
the late 1980s, demonstrate the ‘extraordinary continuity […] in between the archaic and 
later Sumeric texts’ (Liverani 1998: 14–6). 
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 The question now concerns the character of the civilization that can be 
associated with this presumably epiphany-based religion. The starting point given by the 
most recent evidence is negative, provided by a caesura: the imposing megalithic 
sanctuaries of the earlier period (10th–8th millennia BC, Göbekli Tepe, Nevali Çori and 
Çayönü; see Sagona and Zimansky 2009, Schmidt 2010) were abandoned in what is now 
interpreted as the crisis of the Neolithic around 7000BC (Frangipane 1996: 51ff; 
Verhoeven 2002: 10–1).4 It is only from about 6000BC that a new dynamics of 
prosperity, arguably amounting to social flourishing, appears with the Samarra, Hassuna 
and especially Halaf cultures in northern, central and eastern Mesopotamia. Such 
flourishing is particularly evident in high-quality hand-painted pottery. Fine quality 
decorated pottery, connected to new forms of community rituals and communicative 
symbolism, emerged around 6200BC, culminating in the Halaf culture, where pottery has 
‘become an important symbolic medium’, with decoration carrying a meaning, as 
revealed by the stylistic rules guiding the designs (Verhoeven 2002: 9–10). The striking 
beauty of hand-painted ware, including bowls, plates and vases (Frangipane 1996: 73–6; 
Matthews 2003: 20; Wengrow 2001), used in the everyday life of a society lacking signs of 
institutionalized social differentiation (Frangipane 2007), not only intimates high 
aesthetic standards, but also a markedly harmonious relationship between human beings 
and their surroundings, recalling Minoan Crete or the Italian Renaissance. 
The decorated objects were not exchanged within a commercial or mercantile 
system, but were part of a gift network (Frangipane 1996: 84–5, 2007: 62–3), underlying 
the need to interpret archaeological evidence in the context of Maussian anthropology 
and not neoclassical or neo-Marxist economics (Calasso 2010; Wengrow 2010). The logic 
of gift exchange was pervasive in the region throughout the sixth and fifth millennia BC, 
animating the single most important new development, creating the conditions of future 
transformations: the establishment of intensive relationships among settlements across a 
vast interregional area (Frangipane 2007: 87). These findings again confirm the insights 
of Marcel Mauss: civilizations emerge out of networks of relations, rather than ‘grow’ as 
if organic, and in isolation (Mauss 2006; see also Ingold 2000). 
 Further novelties include the use of stamps and sealings. While previously it was 
thought that this technique emerged due to centralization and state-building, the great 
diffusion of such objects in the sixth and fifth millennia BC convinced scholars that 
things happened the other way around, just as concerning agriculture and sanctuaries: 
communal practices established in the context of gift exchange were later used by 
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emerging central authorities and turned into commercial use (Frangipane 1996: 138). 
From a sociological perspective, the central points are the primacy of gift network and 
the later, joint development of centralization and commercialization. Here, as elsewhere, 
commercialization and governmentalization (Foucault) are parasitic developments, using 
and abusing previous centuries, even millennia of community and personality building.  
These developments were significantly altered around 4000BC when, in a series 
of steps, the logic of the entire system got inverted. These changes can be associated with 
the rise of metallurgy, and arguably resulted in the first period of ‘globalizing growth’. 
 
Uruk, Mesopotamia: The rise of the first ‘global city’ 
 
The significance of Uruk culture is well known for experts. According to Roger 
Matthews, Mesopotamia in the 4th millennium BC offers a unique opportunity, in the 
sense that ‘the primary states’ were ‘originating in pristine condition on the plains of 
Mesopotamia’ (Matthews 2003: 109). In a similar light, Marcella Frangipane argues that 
the period and the region offers an ‘ideal laboratory’ for studying the origins of 
institutionalized power and central political authority, including the ‘birth of the control 
of the economy by privileged classes’ and the ‘emergence of the first central public 
institutions and bureaucracy’, which happened even before the invention of writing; in 
sum, a new perspective on ‘the birth of the state’ (Frangipane 2004: 13). Mario Liverani 
uses similarly momentous terms, arguing that the ‘so-called Uruk culture marks the 
emergence of the first urban society’ (Liverani 1998: vi); or that Uruk was the ‘first 
complex society’ (1998: v). In the last page of his book, Liverani resumes the 
‘extraordinary achievements’ of the period as being at the same time ‘urbanistic and 
architectural, artistic and literary, technological and ideological’ (1998: 111) – a list 
directly comparable to summary characterizations of Athens (Hall 1999: 24). Matthews is 
similarly resolute: the ‘Uruk phenomenon’ is simply ‘unique’ (Matthews 2003: 109), given 
that ‘the extent and intensity of the Uruk expansion, as materially attested in the 
archaeological record, are such that historical analogies, even from places and times 
historically contiguous to those of the Uruk, totally fail us’ (2003: 125). 
The relatively abrupt shift around 4000BC from qualitative to quantitative is quite 
striking. At the beginning of the period, the size of individual temples and the entire 
temple complex started to grow out of bounds in Uruk. Already during the 5th 
millennium BC, there was a spectacular increase in temple size when, from modest-sized 
	   15 
buildings, they grew into imposing, 200 square metre structures (Liverani 1998: 31–3), 
showing a certain affinity with the megalithic sanctuaries of Nevali Çori and Göbekli 
Tepe (Sagona and Zimansky 2009: 42). But, from around 4000BC, there was a genuine 
explosion of the temple complex, including an exponential growth in building size, with 
single temples covering 1500 square metres.  
Growth in temple size was followed by expansion in the surface of the city area. 
Around 3200BC, within a relatively short period, population density in Uruk increased 
tenfold (Matthews 2003: 110). As a result, by 2900BC the city grew to the staggering size 
of 5.5 km2, containing nearly 100,000 inhabitants (Nissen 1990: 80–1). In comparison, 
classical Athens extended to about 2.5 km2, while Jerusalem was only 1 km2 (50AD), and 
even Rome at the height of the Empire (100 AD) was only about twice the size of Uruk 
(1990: 80–1). 
 The phenomenon takes off in the transition phase in between Ubaid and Uruk 
cultures, at around 4000BC: a ‘shadowy period’ (Matthews 2003: 108) about which we 
still possess little evidence (Frangipane 1996: 168). Apart from growth in temple and city 
sizes, this period is marked by significant changes in material culture. The centre of 
agricultural innovation is now the south, or Mesopotamia proper, where a series of 
technical inventions, focusing on irrigation, radically increased productivity (Nissen 1990: 
21–4; Frangipane 2007). The ‘long field’ method, the sowing plough and the terracotta 
sickle enabled a five- to tenfold increase in crops (Liverani 1998: 20–25).  
 Following standard logic, such growth in productivity is expected to increase 
leisure time and improve artistic creativity. In fact, the opposite happened: the high 
quality hand-painted pottery marking previous cultures disappeared in the Uruk period, 
being replaced by low-quality mass-produced ware, the so-called ‘bevelled rim bowls’, 
used for fast meals by workers employed in the central administration (Frangipane 1996: 
147–51, 169–71; Matthews 2003: 106–7; Nissen 1990: 91–2). Growth in productivity 
instead led to an accentuation of social stratification, producing two classes, functionaries 
and workers (Frangipane 1996: 174–5). Similar utilitarian mechanization characterized 
building technology, where brick-laying was replaced by the application of flat bricks, 
more like tiles, which could be thrown upon each other quickly, without need for care, 
being kept together by their own weight (Nissen 1990: 102–3). 
 This change became particularly intense around the middle of the millennium, 
amounting to a ‘Great Transformation’ (Frangipane 1996: 177).5 A central role was 
played by the discovery of metallurgy in Southern Anatolia and the rise to prominence of 
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Arslantepe, a liminal site between Anatolia, the Trans-Caucasus and Mesopotamia. Metal 
objects were already used in the 8th millennium BC but, at that time, only the technique 
of ‘cold hammering’ was known. Melting was first experimented with in Yümük Tepe, 
Mersin (a port in Cilicia), during the late 5th millennium BC (Sagona and Zimansky 2009: 
139, 205). The large-scale production of metals, however, only took place in Arslantepe 
around 3500BC (Frangipane 1996: 165–7, 203; 2004: 59, 66). This technological 
development had two main aspects: advanced experimenting with arsenic and tin made 
copper stronger, producing more resistant bronze, pioneering a transition to the Bronze 
Age, identified as the ‘age of warriors’ in both Greek and Hindu mythology; while 
experiments with aesthetic forms resulted in the emergence of an artisanal class, but soon 
also the mass-production of identical items, imitating the same forms. The invention of 
bronze swords illustrates well the process. At first, high-quality artisanal swords were 
made for ceremonial purposes, probably sword-dancing, around 3500BC; this was 
followed by hand-made military swords for the elite, and eventually mass-produced 
swords for ever larger armies. 
Arslantepe is a site excavated by Italian researchers, and knowledge about it is 
still rather limited. This settlement, going back to about 4250BC, is liminal not only in a 
geographical and thus cultural sense, but also as it represents the point of encounter 
between agricultural and metallurgical innovativeness. The character and speed of 
transformation can be captured by changes in the size, shape and function of large 
buildings. Monumental, terraced palaces appeared between 3500–3200BC, replacing the 
previous, smaller temple structures (Frangipane 1996: 234–7, 2004: 47; Sagona and 
Zimansky 2009: 155–62). The significance of changes is convened through momentous 
expressions: this ‘Great Transformation’ marks a shift ‘from Temple to Palace’ 
(Frangipane 2004: 59), with the Arslantepe terraced complex representing ‘the most 
ancient palace complex’ in the world (2004: 60). Temple-palaces were decorated by wall 
paintings, another innovation, again advancing both Minoan Crete and the Italian 
Renaissance, present especially in storage rooms, and transit areas or passages 
(Frangipane 1996: 241, 2004: 47–59). 
This type of change, pioneered by Arslantepe, was fed back into the South, 
generating the explosion of Uruk in size around 3200BC. 
 
 The emergence of the Uruk system is a process of vital importance for social 
theory, as it can be considered the first ‘global village’ (Wengrow 2010: 54), or rather city, 
	   17 
centre of the first global network. The high degree of interconnectedness only became 
visible due to the drawing up of ‘survey maps’, an approach pioneered by Thorkild 
Jacobsen, an important associate of Henri Frankfort, and continued by Robert Adams 
(Liverani 1990: x–xii; Matthews 2003: 47–51). 
 During the fourth millennium BC, it was not only contacts between the south 
and the north that intensified and homogenization that deepened, but the network also 
became extended, incorporating areas such as Malatya and Susa (Elam), which never 
before or after became subordinated to Mesopotamia (Frangipane 1996: 174, 7, 205–6).6 
By the middle of the millennium, this resulted in a new practice of population 
movements (Frangipane 1996: 212–28). In contrast to previous periods, when people 
shifted location mostly within a relatively limited area and only small ‘elite’ groups 
maintained contacts between regions, now, on the one hand, settlements became much 
more stable as local communities were no longer split due to population surplus moving 
to new areas and, on the other, large groups of people were continuously moving out of 
the south, either founding new towns or settling inside existing ones, radically altering 
local ways of life. 
 Interpreting these developments is a central preoccupation of archaeologists. It 
cannot be considered an early example of international trade, as settlers from the south 
did not set up trading networks, rather brought their entire agricultural package to 
northern towns, which then came to function on the basis of autarchy, not being 
interested in sending the surplus back into the mother town. It was not a colonial 
expansion either, as satellite towns were not subjugated and integrated into a hierarchical 
system, which in itself invalidates Guillermo Algaze’s (1993) attempt to apply 
Wallerstein’s ‘world system’ theory. If anything, the practice recalls the Greek type of 
colonization (Frangipane 1996: 227), though with a major difference: ‘colonisers’ 
remained physically and culturally separate from indigenous population, with no 
intermarriage taking place (Matthews 2003: 119–20, based on the excavations of 
Hacınebi by Gil Stein). 
 Reading these attempts at understanding is quite fascinating, as they exude a 
palpable atmosphere of intense reflection and thinking (Matthews 2003: 115–6; 
Frangipane 1996: 226–7). Not simply general, modernist interpretive frameworks, but 
even basic assumptions that drove archaeologists for long decades had to be abandoned. 
These include attempts to justify Old Testament narratives; predilection to invasions, a 
secular legacy of the previous; excessive emphasis attributed to written evidence; and the 
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assumption – for long treated as evidence – that changes in pottery style automatically 
imply the arrival of new ethnic groups. This led Nissen to suggesting that the division of  
‘prehistory’ and ‘history’, based on the presence of writing, should be abandoned 
(Liverani 1990: ix–x). 
A central recent development concerns the novel significance attributed to 
religious factors. In his later Preface, Nissen expressed regret to have devoted so little 
attention to religion in his original edition (Nissen 1990: xix); while a recent survey 
recognizes a general shift away from materialist and economic explanations (Sagona and 
Zimansky 2009: 40–2; see also Insoll 2004). The reasons for Uruk globalization might 
thus lie, ‘in contrast to our contemporary bias’, in religious considerations (Matthews 
2003: 120). Such an idea is even self-evident, as Uruk was a religious capital even before 
the Uruk system; but, in trying to capture the character of such a religion, Matthews 
suggests moving beyond the framework still applied by Liverani: priestly strata 
manipulating masses through imposed ideology (Liverani 1998: 33–4). Uruk temple 
religion, though well-organized, was originally not despotic, as the central concern of its 
buildings and ceremonies was divine presence (Matthews 2003: 116), and behind this, 
one can even intuit the idea of human indebtedness towards the divine (2003: 121). 
Strikingly, Matthews’ argument leads back to Nietzsche’s (1967) Genealogy of Morals. 
The Uruk dynamics is not due to religious factors alone, but rather the particular 
inflexion given to Mesopotamian cultic religion by the rise of metallurgy. In modernity, 
religious developments and technological innovations are considered to be unrelated. 
The historical connection between religion, magic and metallurgy, however, is well 
established – it is enough to evoke the ritualistic role played by smiths in many cultures 
(Blakely 2006; Horvath 2013; Popov 1933). It is through this combination of the 
religious-cultic and the technological-scientific that the Mesopotamian case can help 
sociologists capture the ‘spirit’ of globalization, adding the Newtonian obsession with the 
void and limitless to the Weberian concern with Puritanism. 
It is here that the crucial significance played by Arslantepe – excavated only 
recently – for Uruk culture can be captured, through the methodological perspective 
offered by liminality, offering broader relevance for understanding the rise and dynamics 
of globalizing processes. Arslantepe is at a liminal position, in between Anatolia and 
Mesopotamia, thus at the borderline of two different cultural entities. Such a position 
helped it become a centre of innovation through the rise of metallurgy. As a 
consequence of taking over these technological innovations, Uruk, the traditional 
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religious centre, was transformed into a ‘bureaucratic’ political-administrative centre and 
then exploded in its population, resulting a growth that became unsustainable and 
brought about the collapse of the entire system. 
 
The collapse of the Uruk global network 
 
Around 3000BC-2900BC, the global network exploded. The crisis affected all areas, so it 
can be compared to the catastrophic events around 1200BC (Drews 1993), of which 
memory survived in the form of the ‘Trojan War’. Destruction, just as in the latter case, 
was not uniform. It was greatest in the liminal zone, with Arslantepe burnt and destroyed 
around 3000BC, while relatively minor in the Southern Mesopotamian alluvial area. Still, 
the entire network was disorganized and never reconstituted. 
 Led by the south, few centuries later, a new dynamism called ‘second 
urbanization’ took off (Liverani 1998: 108). Amongst and out of the ruins, a renewed 
practice emerged: human sacrifice. There is no evidence for this practice in the region for 
6000BC–3000BC, though it was present in Çayönü earlier; even the structure of temples 
is unsuited for performing such rituals (Abusch 2002; Margueron 2005). Prime examples 
include the Royal Tomb of Ur, dated 2600BC, and the ritual sacrifice of four young 
adults (three females) around 2700BC in Arslantepe, discovered in contorted poses 
around a princely tomb (Frangipane 2004: 115–21).7 The case is again similar to Minoan 
Crete, where evidence of human sacrifice is only available from the last periods of 
Minoan civilization (Driessen 2001). 
Even apart from human sacrifice, the second urbanization did not simply imitate 
the first. While temples as centres maintained their continuity and importance, there 
emerged ‘a royal power which in certain cases assumed characteristics that were 
conspicuously militaristic (Akkad) or mercantile (Ebla)’ (Liverani 1998: 109–10). These 
developments were amply preserved in writing and images, misguiding posterity about 
their primacy. 
 
Conclusion 
The central claim of this article is that modern globalization is not a unique development, 
but rather can be meaningfully situated as a concrete case of a historical-type globalizing 
processes. Other such types include periods of social flourishing or dark ages, while 
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other cases of globalization are the ecumenic empires after the axial age, or Uruk culture. 
Such types can even be arranged alongside a sequential order. 
 In approaching modern globalization, this article followed the inspiration of Max 
Weber, but went beyond his words in three senses. Methodologically, it followed 
Weber’s Nietzschean genealogical design, in contrast to the neo-Kantian or neo-Marxist 
orientation of most works in contemporary historical sociology, focusing on Nietzsche’s 
concern with backward inference, adding the anthropologically derived concepts 
‘liminality’ and ‘imitation’. Concerning the range of evidence, it went back to the distant 
past, and – beyond Antiquity – it incorporated archaeological evidence. Finally, in terms 
of the moving forces behind historical changes, it not only focused on religious 
developments, but – beyond the concern with charismatic prophets responding to 
societal crises – turned to epiphanies, or sudden experiences of divine presence, thus 
focusing on the type of periods to which the Italian Renaissance belonged, rectifying 
Weber’s relative ignoring of this case.  
 Based on these considerations, the article identified the following hypothetical 
sequence concerning the genesis and dynamics of globalizing processes. Epiphany 
experiences may give rise to genuine processes of social flourishing, manifested by the 
relative absence of violence and the widespread presence of beautiful, carefully crafted 
objects in everyday life, having deep, communal symbolic meaning. Social flourishing can 
be maintained for a long time, but eventually, due to a loss of measure or limits, can 
become inflected into a process of unlimited quantitative growth. Processes of 
globalization, however, become much more quickly unsustainable, exhausting their own 
resources, at which point the system breaks down, globalization being replaced by a ‘dark 
age’ in which social order is assured by systematic warfare, even human sacrifices. As 
concrete example, the article presented evidence from early Mesopotamia, going back to 
the 6th to 5th millennia BC, arguably a period of social flourishing, which led to Uruk 
becoming the first global city and culminated around 3000BC in the collapse of the Uruk 
system. 
 Keeping in mind the delicacy of using historical analogies, the storyline 
reconstructed for Mesopotamia can help sociologists make sense of the sequence of 
events from Renaissance through Reformation, Enlightenment and modernity to the 
current process of globalization. Beyond secularization, the Renaissance was a period of 
social flourishing after the ‘dark ages’ that followed the collapse of the Roman Empire, 
influenced by epiphany experiences. This process got inflected from about the late 
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fifteenth century, with the collapse of the Byzantine Empire and the ensuing discoveries, 
followed by early colonialism and the religious and civil wars of the sixteenth–
seventeenth centuries, where limits were radically redrawn, first of all concerning the 
realm of religion, which eventually resulted in an increasingly limitless, technologically 
driven expansionism. Technological development, however, as the Mesopotamian case 
suggests, is by no means a panacea, as transforming qualitative distinctions into 
quantitative deviations on a single scale provokes endless mimetic rivalries and resource 
exhaustion until certain ultimate natural, societal and human limits are reached that 
threaten the survival of the entire globalizing system.  
 
(Date accepted: November 2015) 
 	  
Notes 
 
1 It is not possible to discuss in detail here the revolutionary aspects of Weber’s charisma. 
Weber conjectures an elective affinity between out-of-ordinary crisis situations and the 
appearance of persons possessing charismatic qualities (1978: 1121). This presumes that 
any such situation will automatically produce charismatic leaders taking care of the 
solution, while ignoring the possibility of sui generis religious developments such as 
epiphanies. 
2 For extending ‘renaissance’ to a type of period, see also Coldstream (1977); Snodgrass 
(1971). 
3 For a similar argument concerning the rise of Greek cities, see Polignac (1995). 
Schmidt’s ideas sparked a debate in the October 2011 issue of Current Anthropology, which 
it is not possible to discuss here. 
4 Continuity persisted in Çatal Höyük, an important Neolithic site not discussed here. 
5 The allusion to Karl Polanyi’s work is by no means fortuitous, as parallels with the 
modern industrial revolution are manifold. 
6 While the names Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran belong to contemporarily terminology, 
continuities in cultural and political differences between the respective geographical areas 
can be traced back to the early Neolithic. 
7 The title of this section is ‘The oldest royal tomb’. 
 
 
	   22 
	  
 
Bibliography 
 
Abu-Lughod, J. 2000 New York, Chicago, Los Angeles: America’s Global Cities, University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Abusch, T. 2002 ‘Sacrifice in Mesopotamia’ in A. Baumgarten (ed.) Sacrifice in Religious 
Experience, Leiden: Brill. 
Algaze, G. 1993 The Uruk World System, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Arnason, J. 2005  ‘The Axial Age and its Interpreters: Reopening a Debate’ in J. 
Arnason, S.N. Eisenstadt and B. Wittrock (eds) Axial Civilisations and World History, 
Leiden: Brill. 
Arnason, J., Eisenstadt, S.N. and Wittrock, B. (eds) 2005 Axial Civilisations and World 
History, Leiden: Brill. 
Bellah, S. and Joas, H. (eds) 2012 The Axial Age and its Consequences, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Bentley, Jerry H. 2006 ‘Beyond Modernocentrism: Toward Fresh Visions of the Global 
Past’ in V.H. Mair (ed.) Contact and Exchange in the Ancient World, Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press. 
Blakely, S. 2006 Myth, Ritual, and Metallurgy in Ancient Greece and Recent Africa, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Burkert, W. 1985 Greek Religion, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Calasso, R. 2010 L’Ardore, Milan: Adelphi. 
Castells, M. 2000 The Rise of the Network Society, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Cauvin, J. 2000 The Birth of the Gods and the Origins of Agriculture, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Clark, G. 1977 World Prehistory in New Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Coldstream, J. 1977 Geometric Greece, London: Benn.  
Drews, R. 1993 The End of the Bronze Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Driessen, J. 2001 ‘Crisis Cults on Minoan Crete?’, Aegeum 22: 361–9. 
Eisenstadt, S.N. 1963 The Political Systems of Empires, Glencoe: Free Press. 
Eisenstadt, S.N. 1982 ‘The Axial Age: The Emergence of Transcendental Visions and 
the Rise of Clerics’, European Journal of Sociology 23(2): 294–314. 
Eisenstadt, S.N. (ed.) 1986 The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilisations, New York: 
SUNY Press. 
	   23 
	  
Eisenstadt, S.N. 1988 ‘Transcendental Vision, Center Formation, and the Role of 
Intellectuals’ in L. Greenfeld and M. Martin (eds) Center: Ideas and Institutions, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
Eisenstadt, S.N. 1992 Kulturen der Achsenzeit II, 3 vols, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 
Eisenstadt, S.N. 2000 ‘Multiple modernities’, Daedalus 129(1): 1–29.  
Eliade, M. 1959 The Sacred and the Profane, New York: Harcourt. 
Elias, N. 1987 ‘The Retreat of Sociologists into the Present’, Theory, Culture & Society 4 
(2/3): 223–47.  
Frangipane, M. 1993 Between the Rivers and over the Mountains, Rome: Università di Roma. 
Frangipane, M. 1996 La nascita dello Stato nel Vicino Oriente, Rome: Laterza. 
Frangipane, M. (ed.) 2004 Alle origini del potere: Arslantepe, la collina dei leoni, Milan: Electa. 
Frangipane, M. 2007 ‘Different Types of Egalitarian Societies and the Development of 
Inequality in Early Mesopotamia’, World Archaeology 39(2): 151–76. 
Frank, A.G. and Gills, B. 1993 The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?, 
London: Routledge. 
Frankfort, H. 1948 Kingship and the Gods, Chicago:  University Press. 
Giddens, A. 1990 The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity. 
Giesen, B. 2006 ‘Performing the Sacred’ in J. Alexander, B. Giesen and J. Mast (eds) 
Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Girard, R. 1977 Violence and the Sacred, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Girard, R. 1989 The Scapegoat, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Groenewegen-Frankfort, H. 1951 Arrest and Movement, London: Faber. 
Hall, P. 1999 Cities in Civilization, London: Phoenix. 
Harvey, D. (1989) The Condition of Postmodernity, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hawken, P., Lovins, A. and Lovins, L. 1999 Natural Capitalism: The Next Industrial 
Revolution, London: Earthscan.  
Horvath, A. 2013 Modernism and Charisma, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Inglis, D. 2014 ‘What is Worth Defending in Sociology Today? Presentism, Historical 
Vision and the Uses of Sociology’, Cultural Sociology 8(1): 99–118. 
Ingold, T. 2000 The Perception of the Environment, London: Routledge. 
Insoll, T. 2004 Archaeology, Religion, Ritual, London: Routledge. 
Jaspers, K. 1953 The Origin and Goal of History, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Kerenyi, K. 1976 Dionysos: Archetypal Image of Indestructible Life, Princeton: Princeton 
	   24 
	  
University Press. 
Liverani, M. 1990 ‘Preface’ to H. Nissen, Protostoria del Vicino Oriente, Bari: Laterza. 
Liverani, M. 1998 Uruk: la prima città, Bari: Laterza. 
Mann, M. 2012-2013 The Sources of Social Power, 4 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Margueron, J.-C. 2005 ‘Le temple dans la civilisation siro-mésopotamienne: une 
approche généraliste’ in G. Pettinato (ed.) La Casa di Dio: il tempio nella cultura del Vicino 
Oriente Antico, Milan: Ares. 
Marinatos, N. 1993 Minoan Religion: Ritual, Image and Symbol, Columbia, SC: University of 
Southern Carolina Press. 
Matthews, R. 2003 The Archaeology of Mesopotamia, London: Routledge.	  
Matz, F. 1958 ‘Göttererscheinung und Kultbild im minoischen Kreta’, Abhandlungen der 
Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in 
Mainz 12: 991–1015. 
Mauss, M. 2006 Techniques, Technology and Civilization, Oxford: Berghahn. 
Mumford, L. 1966 The City in History, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Nietzsche, F. 1967 The Genealogy of Morals, New York: Vintage. 
Nietzsche, F. 1974 The Gay Science, New York: Vintage. 
Nissen, H. 1990 Protostoria del Vicino Oriente, Bari: Laterza. 
Oppenheim, L. 1977 Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead Civilization, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Nederveen Pieterse, Jan (2012) "Periodizing Globalization: Histories of Globalization," 
New Global Studies 6: 2, 1–25. 
Pine, B. and Gilmore, J. 1999 The Experience Economy, Boston: Harvard Business 
School. 
Plato (1925) ‘Philebus’, in Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 9, London: Heinemann. 
Polignac, F. de 1995 Cult, Territory, and the Origins of the Greek City-State. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Popov, A. 1933 ‘Consecration Ritual for a Blacksmith Novice among the Yakuts’, The 
Journal of American Folklore 46(181): 257–71. 
Sagona, A. and Zimansky, P. 2009 Ancient Turkey, London: Routledge. 
Salvatore, A. 2007 ‘The Exit from a Westphalian Framing of Political Space and the 
Emergence of a Transnational Islamic Public’, Theory, Culture and Society 24(4): 45–52. 
Sassen, S. 1991 The Global City, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
	   25 
	  
Schmidt, K. 2000 ‘ “Zuerst kam der Tempel, dann die Stadt” ’, Istanbuler Mitteilungen 50: 
5–41. 
Schmidt, K. 2010 ‘Göbekli Tepe – the Stone Age Sanctuaries’, Documenta Praehistorica 37, 
237–56. 
Simonetti, C. 2013 ‘Between the vertical and the horizontal: Time and space in 
archaeology’, History of the Human Sciences 26(1): 90–110. 
Smith, M., Ur, J. and Feinman, G. 2014 ‘Jane Jacobs’ “Cities First” Model and 
Archaeological Reality’, International Journal of Regional and Urban Research 38(4): 1525–35. 
Snodgrass, A. 1971 The Dark Age of Greece, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Taylor, P. 2014 Extraordinary Cities, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Thomassen, B. 2010 ‘Anthropology, Multiple Modernities and the Axial Age Debate’,	  
Anthropological Theory 10(4): 321–42. 
Thomassen, B. 2014 Liminality and the Modern: Living through the In-between, Farnham 
Surrey: Ashgate. 
Turner, V. 1967 ‘Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage’ in V. 
Turner, The Forest of Symbols, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Turner, V. 1969 The Ritual Process, London: Routledge. 
van Gennep, A. 1960 The Rites of Passage, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Verhoeven, M. 2002 ‘Transformations of Society: The Changing Role of Ritual and 
Symbolism in the PPNB and the PN in the Levant, Syria and South-East Anatolia’, 
Paléorient 28(1): 5–13. 
Voegelin, E. 1974 The Ecumenic Age, Vol. 4 of Order and History, Baton Rouge: University 
of Louisiana Press. 
Weber, M. 1948a ‘Religions Rejections of the World and Their Directions’ in H. Gerth 
and C.W. Mills (eds) From Max Weber, London: Routledge. 
Weber, M. 1948b ‘The Social Psychology of the World Religions’ in H. Gerth and C.W. 
Mills (eds) From Max Weber, London: Routledge. 
Weber, M. 1978 Economy and Society, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Wengrow, D. 1999 ‘The Intellectual Adventure of Henri Frankfort: A Missing Chapter 
in the History of Archaeological Thought’, American Journal of Archaeology 103(4): 597–613. 
Wengrow, D. 2001 ‘The Evolution of Simplicity: Aesthetic Labour and Social Change in 
the Neolithic Near East’, World Archaeology 33(2): 168–188. 
Wengrow, D. 2010 What Makes Civilization: The Ancient Near East and the Future of the 
West, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
	   26 
	  
Wittrock, B. 2005 ‘The Meaning of the Axial Age’ in J. Arnason, S.N. Eisenstadt and B. 
Wittrock (eds) Axial Civilisations and World History, Leiden: Brill. 
Yoffee, N. 1995 ‘Political Economy in Early Mesopotamian States’, Annual Review of 
Anthropology 24: 281–311. 
 
